Monday, April 19, 2010

Senior Research Fellow position

The Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine at University of Sydney is currently looking for a 0.6 FTE senior research fellow to work on a Clinical Ethics project for 2 years. The position would be suitable for someone with extensive experience in qualitative research and project management, from a discipline such as bioethics, health social sciences, medical humanities or other related areas. Details are available here.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

Elliot Sober, Sydney Ideas Open lecture

Current University of Sydney International Visiting Fellow, Hans Reichenbach Professor Elliott Sober (University of Wisconsin), will be giving a Sydney Ideas Open lecture on "Darwin and Intelligent Design," on Thursday, 22 April. For further information, click here.

Venue: Sydney Law School foyer, Eastern Avenue, Camperdown Campus.
Time: Thursdays 6.00pm to 7.00pm
Format: 40 minute lecture followed by 20 minute Q & A
Recording: Audio podcasts will be available three days after the lecture
Cost: This is a free series, and all are welcome. No RSVP or registration is needed, please just turn up.

Kristie Miller, presenting paper at University of Wollongong

Kristie Miller (USyd) will be presenting at the University of Wollongong Philosophy Research Seminar series next Tuesday. All are welcome to attend.


Title: "Motion, laws and plenitude: Are there objects to which the laws of nature do not apply?"


When & where: April 20th, 5:30pm in room 19.1003


Abstract: It is a natural to assume that the domain of the concrete objects is coextensive with the domain of the objects to which the natural laws apply, and therefore that if we can find any concrete object that is at rest and does not stay at rest unless acted on by a net force, then we have found something that violates the law of inertia. Recently, however, this assumption has been challenged. The locus of this challenge has come from a number of metaphysicians who sign up for what I will call a plenitudinous ontology. Given a plenitudinous ontology, a great number of entities seem to be ones that violate one or other law of nature.Friends of plenitude have responded by conceding that the entities in question do violate the laws in question, and suggesting that the correct response is to distinguish two different kinds of concrete entity: the ones to which the laws apply, and the ones to which they do not. In this paper I advocate an alternative strategy according to which when the laws are properly understood, no concrete entity in the plenitudinous ontology ever violates those laws.

Elliott Sober (Hans Reichenbach Professor, University of Wisconsin), "Darwin on Group Selection"

April 19th 2010
6pm – 8pm
NEW LAW ANNEXE SR 340
(marked ‘Teaching’ on map)

Sydney-Tilburg "The Future of Philosophy of Science" conference

Several SCFS researchers are currently in The Netherlands this week, presenting papers at the Sydney-Tilburg conference on the The Future of Philosophy.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010

USyd Foundations of Physics Seminar: Wed 31st Mar

University of Sydney Foundations of Physics Seminars (http://bit.ly/SydFoP) Wednesday, 31st March, 11:30am-1pm


Speaker: Pete Evans (University of Sydney)


Title: Sufficient structure for a dynamic view of time


"The traditional metaphysical debate between static and dynamic views in the

philosophy of time is examined in light of considerations concerning the

nature of time in physical theory. A sentiment commonly expressed in the

literature is that both static and dynamic views of time are consistent with

Minkowski's formulation of special relativity (in terms of Minkowski

spacetime). Adapting the formalism of Rovelli (1995, 2004), I set out a

precise framework in which to characterise some of the various

representations of time that we find in both physical theory and philosophy.

This framework is used to provide a new perspective on the argument for the

compatibility of the dynamic view of time and the special theory of

relativity. The origin of this compatibility is the dual representations of

time we find in special relativity. I extend this analysis to the general

theory of relativity with a view to prescribing the sufficiency conditions

that must be met for the dynamic view of time to be consistent with

classical physics."


Philosophy Common Room, Room S413, A14 Main Quad,

University of Sydney