Friday, March 26, 2010
Seminar with Elliott Sober, "How to Construct an A Priori Causal Model – the Example of Sex Ratio Evolution"
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
University of Sydney Foundations of Physics Seminars (http://bit.ly/SydFoP) Wednesday, 31st March, 11:30am-1pm
Speaker: Pete Evans (University of Sydney)
Title: Sufficient structure for a dynamic view of time
"The traditional metaphysical debate between static and dynamic views in the
philosophy of time is examined in light of considerations concerning the
nature of time in physical theory. A sentiment commonly expressed in the
literature is that both static and dynamic views of time are consistent with
Minkowski's formulation of special relativity (in terms of Minkowski
spacetime). Adapting the formalism of Rovelli (1995, 2004), I set out a
precise framework in which to characterise some of the various
representations of time that we find in both physical theory and philosophy.
This framework is used to provide a new perspective on the argument for the
compatibility of the dynamic view of time and the special theory of
relativity. The origin of this compatibility is the dual representations of
time we find in special relativity. I extend this analysis to the general
theory of relativity with a view to prescribing the sufficiency conditions
that must be met for the dynamic view of time to be consistent with
Philosophy Common Room, Room S413, A14 Main Quad,
University of Sydney
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
The Philosophy Department, Otago University is hosting a one day workshop on "Composition, constitution, and mereology" to take place on Saturday, 5 June 2010. Invited speakers include former SCFS visiting fellow Patrick Greenough and SCFS researcher Kristie Miller. Abstracts can be sent to firstname.lastname@example.org by 16 April.
Abstract: The credence you assign to a proposition is an important part of your epistemic attitude toward that proposition. But it's not the whole story. Another important factor is the stability of your credence: roughly the extent to which you expect it to change as you acquire new evidence. Expert probability functions -- be they the credences of your trusted weather forecaster, the credences of your future self or the objective chances -- serve to guide your credences to particular values. But they also serve to stabilize your credences, relative to particular types of evidence. By exploring this feature, I think we can better understand the relationship between credence and expert opinion, including the relationship between credence and objective chance.
22 March 1 - 2:30 pm
University of Sydney philosophy common room